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Abstract 
Article 50 has explicitly formalized the exit option that previously existed in an implicit form.  The 
provision entitles to an unilateral, unconditional but not immediate withdrawal from the European 
Union which renders relatively easy in procedural terms to trigger the process. Several utilitarian 
reasons explain why a member state may wish to leave an organization such as the EU although in the 
case of the UK 2016 referendum none of them seem to have played a major role. Building on this 
background and Joseph Weiler’s 1999 seminal contribution on the transformation of Europe, this 
paper argues that the formalization of the withdrawal provision undermines loyalty (understood as the 
proclivity to resolve losses of organizational efficiency within the organization) which is at the very 
basis of the EU project. 
Keywords 
Article 50, withdrawal from the EU, Brexit; exit voice and loyalty. 
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I. Introduction* 
The explicit right to withdrawal enshrined in Article 50, far from being redundant for stating the 
obvious, may have subtly transformed the structure of the Member States’ commitment to the EU. J. 
H. H. Weiler
1
 depicted these commitments by applying the notions of exit and voice borrowed from 
Albert O. Hirschman’s seminal analysis.2 In a nutshell, Weiler argued that the implicit exit option led 
to an increase of voice (i.e. the control of governments on decision making). This picture probably 
remained valid until the early 2000s. The Treaty of Lisbon formalised an explicit right to withdrawal 
and this has affected the traditional equilibrium between these two mechanisms: the explicit regulation 
of withdrawal provides a resource for the erosion of loyalty and changes the demands from increasing 
voice to ex post selective exit (i.e. partial exemptions from the EU acquis). In order to substantiate this 
thesis, this chapter first presents the notions of exit, voice and loyalty as constructed by Hirschman and 
applied to the EU by Weiler. It then examines the model of exit contained in the Treaty of Lisbon, 
arguing that formalisation produces significant legal and above all political effects. Section 4 lists and 
describes a typology of these effects. The paper then revises the rationale for exit from organisations 
such as the EU, turning towards the current demands raised against the threat of exit and concludes by 
discussing how this erodes ‘loyalty’. Section 7 describes how the formalisation of exit changes the 
voice mechanism and section 8 concludes.  
II. Interpretation of withdrawal: exit and voice 
In 1970 Hirschman constructed the notions of exit and voice as instruments which individuals and 
groups use to respond to the decline in the performance of products, firms, organisations and public 
corporations.
3
 ‘Exit’ is an economic mechanism and consists of simply abandoning the product, 
organisation, firm etc. Whilst Hirschman did not precisely defined what an ´economic mechanism’ is, 
most likely he meant that utility calculus informs exit decisions. ‘Voice’, on the other hand, is a more 
diffuse mechanism and one which belongs to the sphere of politics. The use of voice results less 
evident: basically, individuals, groups etc. increase their demands for improvement and/or take a more 
active role to control the product/organization. Voice and exit relate closely to each other: in the face 
of declining performance, voice serves to air dissatisfaction and increase involvement through various 
mechanisms, thus improving the product, organisation etc. But this happens on the condition that exit 
is virtually ruled out. Hirschman
4
 argues that the presence of the exit option can sharply reduce the 
probability that the voice option will be taken up widely and effectively. Later, he expanded his 
previous thesis and in his Exit, voice and the state,
5
 Hirschman focussed on the significance of exit in 
relation to the state but he did not construct a systematic analysis nor did he elaborate on the 
relationship between exit and voice within the state, let alone the connection between these two 
mechanisms and loyalty. The connection between these mechanisms precisely in the case of 
organizations remains underexplored. 
In the Transformation of Europe, Weiler applied these categories to show how the EU had 
successfully closed selective exit (i.e. the selective application of EU law) in the foundational period 
                                                     
*
 I wish to thank Giuseppe Martinico, Maraijke Kleine, Oliver Garner and the participants in the EUI workshop on 
troubled membership in the EU in January 2014 for their valuable comments. 
1
 J. H. H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1992) 100 (8) The Yale Law Journal, 2403–2483. 
2
 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Harvard MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1970). 
3
 Hirschman (n. 2) 
4
 Hirschman (n. 2), p. 76. 
5
 A. O. Hirschman, ‘Exit, Voice, and the State’ (October 1978) 31(01) World Politics, 90–107. 
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while keeping full exit (leaving the Union) an implicit option. To compensate for the selective closure 
of exit, Member States increased their voice, i.e. the political mechanism. This meant an increased role 
for the Council and the intergovernmental procedures for decision making within the Community 
method itself. Full exit did not play any specific role in Weiler´s construction of the relationship 
between voice and selective exit in the EU, even though he conceded that in the face of many lawyers’ 
scepticism, withdrawal remained possible in principle.
6
 He further convincingly argued that insisting 
on the possibility of withdrawal might be counterproductive, especially in an organisation like the EU. 
The original treaties’ silence on the issue created a certain interpretative vacuum on the exit option 
which the application of the posterior Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) could help 
clarify. Although appeal to the Convention has formed the backbone of much legal argument, Article 
4 conclusively establishes that the Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded by States 
after the entry into force of the present Convention. The Convention would thus apply, in purity, after 
the first ‘new’ treaty amending the original ones (i.e. the Single European Act) which entered into 
force in 1987 (the Convention entered into force on 27 January 1980).
7
 
In parallel, the Luxembourg compromise and the generalisation of unanimity along with the 
growing involvement of the Council in decision making (together with the ongoing efforts of 
governments to enlist their nationals in Community institutions such as the EP and the Commission to 
serve their cause) guaranteed states a voice in the EU. Doctrinally, exit options remained contentions 
but the 1974 UK referendum on withdrawal from the Communities proved pragmatically the existence 
of the right to withdraw. No one contested the British government’s assumed right to withdraw if it 
had wished after holding the referendum,
8
 although a significant number of authors argued that the 
EU’s sui generis nature precluded withdrawal.9 After this episode, no other state claimed this right 
again until the German Constitutional Court, in its ruling on the Maastricht Treaty, constructed the 
right of withdrawal as a guarantee of its sovereignty and, hence, inherent to membership.
10
 The Czech 
                                                     
6
 See his ‘Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization: The Case of the European Economic Community’ 
(1985) 20 Israel Law Review, 282–98. However, authors such as Schermers argued that unilateral withdrawal was not 
compatible with international organisations. H. G. Schermers, International Institutional Law (The Hague: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff International Publishers, 1980), p. 29. 
7
 Alternatively, if the Greece Accession Treaty is construed as a reform of the original treaties, then the Convention would 
apply to the EU from the entry into force of the later treaty (i.e. 1 January 1981). 
8
 See A. F. Tatham, ‘Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!: EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon’, in A. 
Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford: OUP, 2012), p. 128, at 144. He follows T. C. 
Hartley, ‘International Law and the Law of the European Union: A Reassessment’ (2001) 72 British Yearbook of 
International Law, 1, 22. 
9
 In the 1980s Greenland withdrawal triggered a debate on whether a state could withdraw from the then EEC. Harhoff 
argued that the unlimited duration established in Article 240 of the Treaty of Rome meant an irrevocable commitment of 
the signatories and deduced from this that unilateral denunciation was illegal and contrary to the aim of the treaties. F. 
Harhoff, ‘Greenland’s withdrawal from the European Communities’ (1983) 20 CMLRev. Other authors subscribing to 
this thesis were Jean Victor Louis, The Community Legal Order (2nd edition, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities 1990), p. 74; and Michael Akehurst, ‘Withdrawal from international 
organizations’ (1979) 32 Current Legal Problems, 152. Louis however specified that the Community was dissoluble only 
by virtue of being a step in a gradual process towards union. However, a significant number of other actors argued that 
withdrawal was possible: J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Supranationalism revisited – a retrospective: the European Communities after 
30 years’, in W. Mainhoffer (ed.), Noi si mura (Florence: EUI, 1983); Roy Pryce, The politics of the European 
Community (London: Butterworths, 1975), p. 55; and Paul Taylor, ‘The European Community and the State: 
Assumptions, Theories and Propositions’ (1991) 17 (2) Review of International Studies, 109–125. P. D. Dagtoglou 
opined that ‘whether withdrawal was excluded or not depended not on the aim to integrate “in abstracto”, but only on the 
stage of integration actually reached “in concreto”’: P. D. Dagtoglou (ed.), Basic problems of the European Community 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975). The EP legal affairs committee concluded that it was not possible to conclude on 
whether a state could withdraw from the EC, PE Doc 1-264/83, p. 9 
10
 Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of October 12, 1993 in Cases 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 Re 
Maastricht Treaty [BVerfG 89,155]  
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Constitutional Court also asserted the same view in its ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon precisely in 
reference to Article 50.
11
 
While full exit implicitly formed part of the nature of the EU, the Single European Act (SEA) 
opened a path to a different modality of selective exit that the Treaty of Maastricht consolidated and 
later treaties enlarged: the progressive inclusion of opt-out provisions which allow the selective 
derogation of specific policies measures for specific states. In relation to the situation described by 
Weiler, EU law applies equally to all participating Member States but not all states participate equally. 
As I will argue below, the withdrawal threat creates the conditions for new modalities of selective 
derogation of the acquis: ex pots partial derogation. Before developing this argument further, the next 
section reviews the characteristics of the formalised exit provision. 
III. The formalisation of full exit 
Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly regulates withdrawal. Allegedly, formalisation of 
withdrawal explodes two basic assumptions about the EU: that European integration is irreversible and 
that Member States have waived their right to dissolve the Union.
12
 It also confirms the interpretations 
of the German and Czech constitutional courts mentioned above.  
While recourse to the general rules of international law was possible in the absence of explicit 
provisions,
13
 formalisation of the right of withdrawal in Article 50 immediately renders general rules 
of international law inapplicable because of the principle ‘lex specialis derogate legi generali’.
 
Releasing the EU from the strictures of international law means on the one hand, enhancing EU 
autonomy vis-à-vis that order, but on the other hand, it also means releasing Member States from the 
stricter conditions for withdrawal in international law.
14
 Explicit regulation hardly represents a novelty 
in international public law since a significant number of international organisations regulate the same 
option along similar lines.
 15
 But an important caveat applies to this trend: while denunciation and 
withdrawal are a regularised component of modern treaty practice, they are not that common for 
international organisations.
16
 Accordingly, if withdrawal regulation is not exceptional but not 
widespread either, the question which stands is why or for what purpose the EU Member States 
decided to introduce an explicit provision on withdrawal given the significant agreement among legal 
scholars about its facticity. If withdrawal was possible in any case, why bother mentioning it explicitly? 
A trend towards institutional isomorphism with other international organisations would not appear to 
explain the provision (at least not in the sense that this convergence is interpreted as a mechanism for 
reasserting the EU’s international law nature).  
The provision originated in the works of the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-2003) and 
some responses may be found in this setting. One specifically legal response would be that Article 50 
                                                     
11
 Czech Republic Constitutional Court Judgment Pl. ÚS 19/08: Treaty of Lisbon I 2008/11/26. 
12
 Jochen Herbst, ‘Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are the “Masters of the 
Treaties”?’ (2005) 6 German Law Journal, 1755, at 1759. He appealed to both assumptions in order to argue that the 
legality of the right of withdrawal could be challenged. 
13
 H. Hofmeister, ‘Should I stay or Should I Go? – A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU’ (2010) 16 
ELJ, 589 at 591. 
14
 C. Hillion, ‘Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union’, in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford: OUP, 2015), p. 126; and in this volume. 
15
 In comparative international regulation, withdrawal is also in almost all cases an unconditional option and withdrawing 
states do not need to provide any kind of justification for this decision. Only the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Organization for Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) construe the right to withdraw as 
deriving from a state deciding that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Conventions, jeopardised 
their superordinate national interest (Arts. 16 and 24 respectively). 
16
 Helfer(n. 22), 1602. 
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serves to dispel any legal doubts about withdrawal. The Praesidium of the Convention thus argued that 
even though withdrawal was possible even in the absence of an explicit specific provision to that 
effect, its insertion clarifies the situation and allows the introduction of a procedure for negotiating and 
concluding an agreement between the Union and the withdrawing state.
17
 Agreeing on the procedure 
before a specific instance of its application emerges is easier than achieving the same agreement 
against the background of an actual case of separation.
18
 Notably, the provision does not clarify all of 
the necessary elements completely and some actors have rightly criticised it for this incompleteness.
19
 
Introduction of procedural clarification still begs the question why it is necessary to dispel doubts 
about something generally agreed, on the one hand, but which results politically costly to implement, 
on the other? Furthermore, the introduction of procedural requirements also skews our conception of 
exit as being more likely (or even desirable). Why?  
Withdrawal was agreed in the context of a significant uplift in the EU’s ambitions with the 2005 
EU Constitution. The Praesidium argued that the provision was a political signal to anyone inclined to 
opine that the Union is a rigid entity which is impossible to leave. Thus, in line with theoretical 
interpretations of the right to exit, explicit formalisation of withdrawal functions as an ‘insurance 
policy’ against future uncertainty permitting at state to renounce to its commitments if the anticipated 
benefits of cooperation turn out to be overblown.
20
 The existence of this ‘insurance policy’ enables 
states to negotiate more expansive or deepen substantive treaty commitments ex ante, although it 
raises troubling opportunities for strategic action ex post.
21
 This was precisely the context of the EU 
Constitution: the right to withdraw was thus understood as a safety valve to reassure Member States 
that they would always be allowed to leave, should they be or become unwilling to pursue the 
emboldened integration path embodied by the Constitutional Treaty.
22
 This begs the question why a 
state would wish to leave the EU? Section V below discusses the logics for seeking exit but next 
paragraphs provided a fuller characterization of article 50. 
The peculiarities of withdrawal in the EU result from the interaction of its characteristics with the 
specific nature of the Union. Article 50 recognises an unilateral, unconditional and non-immediate 
right to withdrawal. 
- Unilateralism means that the right is totally independent of the will of the EU (EU institutions may 
not even opine on the departing Member State’s communication) and the remaining Member 
                                                     
17
 Draft Constitution, ‘Volume I Revised text of Part One’ (2003) Conv 724/1/03 Rev 1 Annex 2, 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=CV%20724%202003%20REV%201>, accessed 5 July 2015, p. 
131. Similarly, the House of Lords (n. 19) argued that the significance of Article 50 lay, therefore, not in establishing a 
right to withdraw, but rather in defining the procedure for doing so. In contrast, the representative of the Austrian 
government at the Convention, Hannes Farnleitner, argued that the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
the Treaties provide a sufficient basis for termination of membership. Hannes Farnleitner, ‘Suggestion for amendment of 
Article I-59’ <http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/Treaty/pdf/46/46_Art%20I%2059%20Farnleitner%20EN.pdf>, 
accessed 5 July 2015. The representatives of the Dutch government argued that facilitating the possibility of withdrawal 
from the Union is contrary to the idea of European integration set out in the Preamble to the Treaty and captured in the 
expression of ‘an ever closer union’. G. M. de Vries and T. J. A. M. de Bruijn, ‘Suggestion for amendment of Article: 46 
Suggestion for Part III’ (2003), <http://european-convention.europa.eu/docs/Treaty/pdf/46/art46vriesEN.pdf>, accessed 5 
July 2015.  
18
 Rostane Medhi, ‘Brèves observations sur la consecration constitutionnelle d’un droit de retrait volontaire’, in Paul 
Demaret, Inge Govaere and Dominik Hanf (eds.), 30 Years of European Legal Studies at the College of Europe/30 ans 
d’études juridiques européennes au Collège d’Europe: Liber Professorum 1973/74–2003/04 (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 
2005). 
19
 Hofmeister (n. 12), 595. 
20
 Helfer (n. 22), 1591. 
21
 Helfer (n. 22), 1591. 
22
 Hillion (n. 14) and ‘This way, please! A legal appraisal of the EU withdrawal clause’ in this volume; Medhi (n. 40). 
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States.
23
 In relation to this, the Convention moved between two alternatives. On the one hand, 
some British representatives defended a strictly unilateral provision which would merely require a 
notification to the Council for withdrawal to become effective.
24
 On the opposite side, most of the 
proposals and amendments submitted to the Convention on the issue sought either to eliminate 
explicit unilateralism or to introduce mechanisms to correct or limit it. For instance, the Badinter 
proposal subordinated the right to a compulsory agreement with the Union.
25
 The final design 
reflects a compromise between these two and, because of this, the ultimate shape of the 
withdrawal right contains only a specific limitation to unilateralism: the obligation to follow the 
procedure established by Article 50, which renders alternative mechanisms (such as simply 
repealing the domestic legislation which gives EU law effect in a given Member State) illegal.
26
 
Beyond the notification and the requirement to seek an agreement, no other factors modify 
unilateral withdrawal. Some authors have tried to engineer a reasoning which brings the ECJ in as 
the final arbiter of this decision: since treaty provisions are justiciable, Article 50 places the ECJ in 
such a position and it could rule on disputes regarding the validity or not of withdrawing.
27
 
However, it seems unthinkable that a withdrawing state proceeding according to its own domestic 
constitution would entrust the ECJ with the verification of this act. Unilateralism has been 
supported by arguing that the prevalence of the opposite principle (i.e. ‘mutual agreement’ 
between Member States and the EU) on this point would reduce the counter-centralisation force 
underlying the right of secession.
28
 
- Unconditionality means that the exercise of the right to withdrawal is not subjected to any 
preliminary verification of conditions
29
 nor is it even conditional on the conclusion of the 
agreement foreseen in the provision
30
 (see below). Article 50 does not even mention the generic 
circumstances in which this right may be activated, and the proposals aired during the Convention, 
such as the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ (such as revision of the Treaties) or 
conditioned on obtaining unanimous assent of Member States (which would be equivalent to 
                                                     
23
 Hofmeister (n. 13), 592; Tatham (n. 8), 152. Helfer, Laurence (2005) Exiting treaties 91 Virginia Law Review 1579–1648. 
He argues that withdrawal is fundamentally a unilateral act’. 
24
 Allan Dashwood Article 27 CONV 345/02. In reality, it was Peter Hain who submitted the Project entitled, Traité 
constitutionnel de l’Union européenne (Dashwood Project), CONV 345/02 Brussels, 15 October 2002.  
25
 For instance, the Badinter proposal (Une constitution européenne (Artículo 80) CONV 317/02, 30 September 2002) 
modified strict unilateralism by granting states the final right to withdrawal but it could only be exercised with the EU’s 
agreement (Art. 80). 
26
 HM Government, ‘The process of withdrawing from the European Union’ (2016) 
<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/138/138.pdf>, accessed 5 June 2016, p. 13. Although 
the UK government declared itself bound to follow the Article 50 procedure, surprisingly, it lays the main emphasis 
against illegal withdrawal on the practical effects of such behaviour on trade negotiations rather than on the illegality per 
se. (Such a breach would create a hostile environment in which to negotiate either a new relationship with the remaining 
member states, or new trade agreements with non EU countries). Equally, the House of Lords concluded that the process 
described in Article 50 is the only way of doing so consistent with EU and international law. House of Lords (2016) The 
process of withdrawing from the European Union European Union Committee 11th Report of Session 2015–16 HL Paper 
138, <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/138/138.pdf> accessed 5 July 2016.  
27
 R. J. Friel, ‘Providing a constitutional framework for withdrawal from the EU: Article 59 of the draft European 
constitution’ (2004) 53 ICLQ, 407–428, at 42; C. Hillion ‘This way, please’ in this volume. 
28
 Wolf Schäfer, ‘Withdrawal legitimised? On the proposal by the Constitutional convention on the right of secession from 
the EU’ (July/August 2003) Intereconomics, 182–185, at 185. 
29
 Cf. Hillion in this volume who argues that some conditions do apply; Herbst (n. 11). According to Helfer, the 
overwhelming majority of the denunciation and withdrawal clauses do not require a state to provide any justification to 
quit a Treaty. Helfer (n.19). 
30
 Hofmeister (n. 12), 593. 
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requesting authorisation) were ruled out.
31
 The Convention also ruled out the option of making 
withdrawal conditional upon completion of the withdrawal agreement: its Praesidium argued that 
if the right of withdrawal existed without explicit regulation, it could not then be made conditional 
upon the conclusion of such an agreement.
32
 Nor could withdrawing in accordance to a country’s 
own constitutional requirements, as explicitly required in the Article, be considered a condition.
33
 
The German Constitutional Court, in its judgment on the Lisbon Treaty, clearly stated that 
‘whether these [national constitutional] requirements [referred to in Article 50 TEU] have been 
complied with in the individual case can, however, only be verified by the Member State itself, not 
by the European Union or the other Member States’.34 The UK Court of Appeal, when deciding 
on the citizens entitled to vote in the 2016 withdrawal referendum, approvingly quoted the 
German decision which argued that Article 50 protected the conditions for the exercise of the right 
of withdrawal from EU level review: invoking provisions on EU citizenship to intervene to 
determine the constitutional requirements to be adopted by a Member State deciding whether to 
leave the EU would be contrary to Article 50.
35
 
As mentioned, Article 50 releases the Union from the strictures of public international law and 
marks a stark contrast with the pre-Lisbon situation
36
 when the absence of an explicit withdrawal 
clause meant the application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. Its Article 62 
requires a ‘fundamental change of circumstances’ for legitimate unilateral withdrawal. 37  The 
International Law Commission indicated two conditions for interpreting what a ‘fundamental 
change of circumstances’ is: they should be central to the reasons for the state’s acceptance to be 
bound by the treaty and/or the effects of the changes must radically change the extent of the 
obligations under the treaty. Article 50 does not contain any reference to changes of circumstances 
and/or obligations to ground a state’s withdrawal, which releases the EU procedure from the 
(allegedly, very light) conditionality under international law. Even more worrisome from the 
perspective of the integrity of EU law, the principle of loyalty/sincere cooperation do not impose 
any condition on withdrawing states,
38
 although it may need to be taken into account.
39
 In 
summary, although the neutralisation of the conditionality implicit in international law may be 
considered an autonomy enhancing tool for EU law, it may also affect some of its core principles. 
- Non-immediate effect.
40
 A unilateral right does not mean an immediate right and this is the sole 
limitation in the whole provision to the full exercise of sovereignty by the withdrawing state. 
                                                     
31
 See for instance, Contribution by Mr Lamassoure, Member of the Convention ‘The European Union: four possible 
models’ (3 September 2002) CONV 235/02 Contribution 83 (05.09) <www.alainlamassoure.eu/liens/366.pdf>, 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=CV%20235%202002%20INIT>, accessed 5 June 2015. 
32
 Draft Constitution, ‘Volume I Revised text of Part One’ (2003) CONV 724/1/03 Rev 1 Annex 2, 
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=CV%20724%202003%20REV%201>, accessed 5 June 2015, p. 
132. Also, Tatham (n. 8). Surprisingly, the House of Lords (n. 19) argues that withdrawal from the EU becomes final 
only once the withdrawal agreement enters into force. 
33
 Cf. Clemens M. Rieder, ‘The withdrawal clause of the Lisbon Treaty in the light of EU citizenship: between 
disintegration and integration’ (2013) 37 Fordham Intern’l LJ, 147–174. 
34
 Judgment No 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009, 
 <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html>, accessed 5 July 2016.  
35
 UK Court of Appeal: Shindler & anr v. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster & anr [2016] EWCA Civ 469. 
36
 For instance, Herbst (n. 11), 1755: ‘there exists no unlimited right of an EU member state to withdraw from the EU; i.e. 
without any further prerequisite and simply at the free discretion of the respective member state, within the confines of its 
internal (constitutional) law provisions’. 
37
 Scholars still dispute the concepts behind Article 62 Vienna Convention. See Helfer (n. 22), 1579. 
38
 Herbst (n. 11), 1758.  
39
 Hofmeister (n. 12), 598. When interpreting Article 50, the principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in article 4(3) TEU 
needs to be taken into account.  
40
 Hofmeister (n. 12), 593. 
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Withdrawal enters into force two years after the formal official communication of a state willing 
to assert this right and the European Council, acting by unanimity, can prolong the two-year 
period with the agreement of the withdrawing state. The EU has not innovated institutionally with 
this provision: most international organisations require a ‘preparation’ or ‘cooling off’ period 
between the announcement of withdrawal and effective withdrawal and this period varies between 
ninety days (for instance, in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization KENDO) 
and two years (for instance, in the Organization of American States OAS), with one year being the 
most common period. 
Two possible interpretations may explain the function of this delay period. The first derives 
directly from Article 50: it permits the adaptation of the EU and the withdrawing state to the new 
circumstances and the changes required and specifically, the negotiation of the withdrawal 
agreement between the Union and the withdrawing state. The assumption is that some kind of 
legal relationship will still remain between the two and that the legal consequences of the 
withdrawal regarding the rights and obligations of natural persons and legal entities affected by 
the withdrawal need to be dealt with. In the absence of such an agreement, the specific legal 
consequences will remain in doubt.
41
 The drafters adopted the longest period commonly provided 
in international organisations, but in practical terms, it remains still too short for negotiating any 
comprehensive agreement.
42
 Perhaps because they conceived of withdrawal as an unrealistic 
possibility, the drafters did not properly think through how complex and lengthy the negotiations 
would need to be. 
The second interpretation brings EU law in line with international law: in other international 
organisations, the delay between announcement and effective withdrawal serves as a ‘cooling off’ 
period allowing the withdrawing State to change its position. For instance, Spain decided not to 
withdraw from the League of Nations in 1928 shortly before its notice to do so would have taken 
effect. The question here is whether this general interpretation in international law can prevail 
when the aim of Article 50 has been precisely to create an autonomous withdrawal procedure. 
Crucially, Article 50 does not state anything about whether the decision is reversible and whether 
a state can backtrack once it has communicated its decision to withdraw. Because of this, the 
House of Lords (2016)
43
 argued that nothing in Article 50 formally (prevents) a Member State 
from reversing its decision to withdraw in the course of the withdrawal negotiations. Although 
this literal interpretation may fit the letter of the provision, prima facie, it seems contrary to the 
spirit of the provision (let alone with the political will asserted by the withdrawing state). To argue 
that a new government may change the decision of a previous one during this period to justify this 
interpretation places the interpretation of EU rules at the disposal of domestic political disputes. 
What is clear is that in case of ambiguity, the authoritative interpreter of the provision is the ECJ. 
In any case, the uncertainty on whether backtracking is possible combined with the long and 
protracted negotiations on alternative agreements during the delay period create a kind of limbo 
membership. Supposedly, the withdrawing state will be still bound by EU legislation and the 
principle of loyal cooperation (Article 4(3)). However, as the date of termination of legal 
obligations under the treaty approaches, domestic authorities may legitimately consider that they 
can exercise a policy of ‘legal detachment’44 (i.e. repealing EU law selectively, as well as the 
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principles of direct effect, primacy and direct applicability). Furthermore, the withdrawing state 
will be in the awkward situation of being a full member of the Union but a third party to the 
effects of concluding the agreement.
45
  
As mentioned above, section V below discusses the logics for seeking exit but first the section below 
list and discusses the possible effects of having a formal explicit provision regulating exit. 
IV. The effects of the exit provision 
An explicitly formalised withdrawal provision creates a wide panoply of possible effects since it 
stimulates both cooperation-diminishing and cooperation enhancing dynamics.
46
 While by no means 
an exhaustive list, the following effects can be listed:  
a. Enlargement of the possible number of members of an organisation or signatories of a Treaty 
Withdrawal provisions are perceived as guarantees for the broad membership of an organisation: they 
may encourage the ratification of a treaty by a larger number of states than those which would be 
prepared to ratify it in the absence of such a clause.
47
 However, the positive value of this effect 
depends on the type of organisation: the number of participating member states may in itself be of 
value for global organisations, which by definition aim to comprising all world states. However, this is 
not necessarily true for regional organisations which can have a maximum number of hypothetical 
participants (defined by geography).  
Alternatively, withdrawal provisions (can) also enable states to negotiate deeper or broader 
commitments than would be attainable for treaties without unilateral exit clauses.
48
 According to 
Helfer, governments often refrain from compelling their partners to accept the entire package of treaty 
commitments in order to facilitate the widespread adoption of multilateral agreements. Instead, they 
permit states to append reservations before expressing their consent to be bound to an agreement.
49
 
The EU treaties do not permit reservations but they possess the functional equivalent: opt-outs which 
are often formulated in protocols. These opt-outs and the additional derogations and exceptional 
provisions for determined Member States are equivalent to a form of selective exist which permit 
Member States to tailor their membership in the Union. As will be discussed below, under such 
condition of selective exit, Member States may find is difficult to identify a clear rationale for full exit. 
In fact, selective exit serves to diminish the margin for full exit in theory, even though the UK case (a 
member state with a significant number of selective exit mechanisms) has demonstrated that it did not 
function in this way. 
b. Guarantee against centralisation and redistribution 
Exit provisions in trade and economic oriented organizations may fulfil specific functions: they may 
be thought as guarantees against centralization processes and redistributive policies. In this line, 
Schäffer interprets exit provisions. He considers that exit and partial exit create a more efficient 
organisation: specifically, if the member states are granted the right to withdraw partially or 
completely from central areas of policy in order to take on responsibility for these areas themselves, 
this encourages an accompanying process of finding the best solution to the problem of the 
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institutional assignment of public tasks within the Community.
50
 The right of secession therefore 
supports vertical institutional competition within the EU.
51
 Economists have argued in response that 
trade agreements are generally less effective where formal escape clauses are easily invoked.
52
 
As for the effects on redistribution, Schäffer’s opinion expresses an ideological preference for 
certain policies: an institutional right of secession in the EU corresponds completely with free trade 
trends caused by globalisation and the intentions of the institutions committed to free trade, such as the 
WTO.
53
 Some economists have echoed a similar preference: thus, Alesina et al.
54
 argue that for 
countries which primarily lose out in strategic redistribution games, the exit option – and even only 
threatening to use it – can work to reduce redistribution and therefore increase efficiency.55  
c. Reputational effects on the withdrawing state 
Formalisation, however, also has important benefits for the withdrawing state: making the exit 
procedures formal, lawful and public, positively affects (in relation to not formalising them) the 
withdrawing state’s reputation for compliance with international law. 56  Following an established 
procedure means complying with the norms even when breaking from an organization and this sends 
positive signals as to the state’s adherence to legal procedures, even in extreme situations such as 
withdrawal. Other states may take note and believe that the withdrawing state remains a reliable 
partner despite its abandoning the organisation. 
d. Strategic behaviour 
A significant number of scholars
57
 agree that explicit withdrawal provisions provide a powerful tool 
for strategic bargaining: the authorities of a member state can threaten withdrawal to obtain 
compensation in circumstances where a country’s cost-benefit of membership calculation changes. In 
this situation, an affected state can try to persuade the EU to compensate it for such changes. 
Therefore, a member state will make certain demands and threaten to withdraw if these demands are 
not met; i.e. the threat of withdrawal can be used to obtain compensation for accepting decisions 
which are necessary to the integration process. And this can occur even if the EU perceives the threat 
as ‘empty words’: even in this case, the EU may choose to compensate in order to eliminate 
uncertainty.
58
 Alternatively, a member state may use the right to withdrawal as a potential right to veto 
or as a potential threat in order to prevent disadvantageous decisions.  
The creation of a formal provision which permits the strategic negotiation of compensation 
explains the opposition of the Commission to the inclusion of a withdrawal clause in the 2004 Draft 
Constitution. The Commission argued that such provision would allow Member States to blackmail 
others by threatening to leave. These effects also explain why theorists have been concerned to find 
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mechanisms to restrain the temptation of strategic gamesmanship. If fact, Helfer argues that the 
principal challenge facing treaty negotiators is to set optimal conditions for exit ex ante so as to deter 
opportunistic exploitation of exist clauses ex post after the treaty has entered into force.
59
 As a result, 
scholars have suggested various mechanisms which could deter strategic behaviour: extra-treaty 
sanctions or incentives;
60
 including a referendum that requires the majority of citizens in the respective 
state to vote for withdrawal (sic);
61
 or demand an exit fee to compensate the EU for losses caused by 
the departure of a Member State.
62
 
Withdrawal provisions undeniably facilitate strategic bargaining behaviour. But is this option 
available equally to all members of an organisation? In fact, two factors condition the bargaining: the 
size and range of the costs in question, and the determination of the threatening government. For the 
first, the ability of a withdrawing actor to externalise the costs of its unilateral decision to the other 
members (and the limitation or non-existence of benefits for the remaining member states) determines 
the size and range of such costs. Every type of cost becomes relevant in the equation: trading and 
economic costs in relation to the market, the feared impact on the dominant ideology within the Union, 
fears of triggering a domino effect etc. Accordingly, to Lechnner and Ohr,
63
 the effectiveness of the 
threat of withdrawal depends on three aspects: the benefit/loss the withdrawing state would experience 
following its decision, the relevance of the withdrawing member to the other members’ integration 
benefits, the benefit loss the other members would suffer in case of withdrawal, and the extent of the 
EU’s benefit gains following the decision. Taking all the factors together, this provision reinforces the 
conclusion that larger states are by definition best placed to gain the most from exit (i.e. large Member 
States have better chances of survival on their own and they can externalise more costs than smaller 
states). Also, larger Member States can cope better with the costs of withdrawal: the loss of investment 
and limiting effects as a result of previous Europeanisation can be assumed to be smaller for large 
Member States.
64
 
The determination of the threatening actor contributes to establishing the credibility of the threat. 
The transformation of the negotiation into a two-level game in which a powerful domestic 
constituency can acquiesce to the results of a negotiation increases greatly the credibility of the threat. 
The paradoxical weakness of the government vis-à-vis this domestic constituency may also enhance 
the credibility of its threat and the readiness of other parties to negotiate.
65
 
In summary, the provision has an anti-equality bias
66
 which a counterfactual question elucidates: 
can the EU cope with the withdrawal of ‘certain’ Member States better than others? For instance, 
could the euro, the eurozone and even the EU withstand a hypothetical withdrawal of Germany? 
Accordingly, the provision has a different meaning depending on which state implements it and how 
this is done: even if withdrawal becomes legally feasible, political and economic considerations will 
nevertheless condition it as a realistic option.
67
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e. Spill-over effects 
The exercise of the right of withdrawal even once makes it more credible for other actors to activate 
the provision in future, thus lowering any cost associated with its activation. In fact, the Danish and 
Irish governments, both bounded by referendum traditions in EU matters, opposed the inclusion of the 
provision in the 2004 Draft Constitution since both countries feared that it would incentivise their 
domestic Eurosceptic groups.
68
 On the occasion of the 2016 UK referendum, groups in other Member 
States voiced their desire to hold similar referenda.
69
 This has led to an inconclusive debate on spill-
over effects: some wonder whether Article 50 will lead to the gradual fragmentation of what was 
supposed to be an ever closer union,
70
 warning of other alternative undesirable consequences such as 
cherry-picking, Europe a la carte or some sort of regressive, gradual disintegration.
71
 Others in turn 
suggest that somewhat paradoxically, the withdrawal procedure may contribute to the EU’s aim of an 
‘ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe’, precisely by making it possible for states to 
withdraw if the integration process becomes untenable.
72
 
V. The rationale for exit. Why would a state seek exit?  
The large state bias inherent to the exit provision anticipates a crucial question in discussing 
withdrawal: why would a member state wish to withdraw? In more precise terms, what political and/or 
economic reasons would make a state wish to withdraw from the European Union? In utilitarian terms, 
decisions for withdrawal can emerge when exogenous or endogenous factors alter the cost-benefit 
calculation.
73
 Rather than being separate, both factors act simultaneously. 
a. Withdrawal as a response to a change of exogenous factors. The difference between EU 
membership and an external position is the decisive of the question of whether membership is benefit-
maximising.
74
 In the early 1990s Buchanan argued that economic integration areas cannot be 
definitive and flexible membership was therefore needed to accommodate market developments.
75
 If 
there exist alternatives outside the organization, states with good alternatives for trade beyond a given 
regional organization can make demand on the other potential members. These other members must 
comply with the demands of the state with outside options to prevent it from exiting the agreement.
76
 
This option is asymmetrical for stated depending on their size: exit options can create larger cost for 
smaller states. Once an agreement is created, it is often costlier for a small state to opt out even if it 
would have preferred no agreement at all.  
If exogenous factors trigger exit, then, formal exit provisions, in themselves, cannot be interpreted 
as triggers. Thus, Gray and Slapin question the extent to which these formal provisions can contain 
exit when confronting those exogenous pull factors. A significant body of literature argues that the 
existence of real incentives outside of the organization (rather than formal provisions) explains 
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changes internal dynamics.
77
 On the one hand, when at least one state within a proposed organisation 
can make a credible threat of exit – or has reasonable prospects of trade beyond the organisation – the 
organisation may be less effective.
78
 In contrast, if countries within a regional economic organisation 
have fewer options for world trade beyond the regional organisation, they will develop strong 
institutions and make substantial use of them. 
b. A second utilitarian reason for withdrawal responds to endogenous factors and, specifically, 
losing a say (i.e. control on decision-making and its outcomes). Using a rational choice approach and 
drawing on the analogy with secession of marginalised regions,
79
 Lechnner and Ohr have interpreted 
the threat as an hypothetical response to qualified majority voting (QMV) losses: withdrawal is an 
alternative for any state which perceives an accumulation of instances of being outvoted under 
QMV.
80
 These authors elaborate on two scenarios in which withdrawal becomes meaningful: either 
the benefit of being sovereign outside the EU is regarded as more valuable than the alternative or 
membership in another regional area is regarded as potentially more beneficial than EU membership. 
Withdrawal can be considered an option in either both scenario.
81
 They conclude optimistically that 
the right of secession set out in the Lisbon Treaty is all-in-all a helpful institutional adaptation to meet 
the challenges besetting today’s European Union. 82  As the evidence set out in the next section 
demonstrates, losses in terms of ‘decisional-power’ do not account rationally for dissatisfaction in the 
UK case. 
c. Beyond these instrumental, utility-based considerations, identity has acquired enormous value in 
explaining satisfaction and/or dissatisfaction with the EU and, hence, it may also explain the push for 
exit. Hooghe and Marks have argued that citizens´ attitudes towards the EU must be understood not 
only in terms of their economic interests but primarily in terms of the perceived challenge to their 
identity that the EU can pose. The opening up of decisional arenas such as referendums permit citizens 
to be rearranged away from their tradition alignments within the party system to lines of conflict 
defined by support/rejection of the EU.
83
 Decisions based on imperfect, incomplete or totally wrong 
information about the functioning of the EU and the costs and benefits for the UK were clearly in 
evidence in the 2016 UK referendum, making identity-based explanations a powerful alternative to 
understand decisions. 
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VI. Enter loyalty 
The revision of the reasons for seeking exit and the effects of the explicit withdrawal provision pave 
the way to advancing beyond the binary relationship between exit and voice. Alongside these 
mechanisms, Hirschman included a third, i.e. loyalty which he defined as the extent to which 
customer-members are willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of an 
improvement in the deteriorated product. This definition connotes a utilitarian (rather than specifically 
moral) foundation for action. Loyalty is important in any organisation since, according to Hirschman, 
it fulfils a key function: it can neutralise within certain limits the tendency of the most quality-
conscious customers or members to be the first to exit.
84
 As a result of loyalty, these potentially most 
influential customers and members will stay on longer than they would ordinarily, in the hope or 
rather reasoned expectation that improvement or reform can be achieved ‘from within’. Thus loyalty, 
far from being irrational, can serve the socially useful purpose of preventing deterioration from 
becoming cumulative, as it so often is when there is no barrier to exit.
85
 For Hirschman, loyalty is a 
key concept in the battle between exit and voice because, as a result of it, members may be locked into 
their organisations a little longer and thus use choose to use the voice option with greater 
determination and resourcefulness than they would otherwise have done.
86
 
Hirschman presents a two-way relationship between voice and loyalty (i.e. loyalty increases the 
tendency to seek voice and having ‘voice’ increases loyalty). But he only shows a one-way 
relationship going from loyalty to exit. For him, loyalty or specific institutional barriers to exit are 
particularly functional whenever the effective use of voice requires a great deal of social inventiveness, 
while exit is an available, yet not wholly effective, option.
87
 Note that exit being an available and yet 
not a wholly effective option is a good description of the situation of a Member State of the EU. 
The second direction the relationship between exit and loyalty can take is important to extracting 
the meaning of withdrawal provisions. What happens when formalised and explicit exit enters the 
scene? What is the effect of increasing exit (i.e. making it less costly) on loyalty? My response is a 
straightforward one: easier exit options undermine loyalty. Taking the specific case of withdrawal 
provisions, they undermine loyalty in two ways: firstly, they grant legal certainty (next to facticity) to 
the full exit option and, because of this, also make it a more credible option. Those purely opposing 
EU membership can immediately argue that, with respect to the relative legal uncertainty of the 
previous situation, explicit withdrawal creates a clearly-defined legal outcome and the procedure to 
achieve it. This reduces the costs of the exit option even if only in the sense that the ultimate legal case 
against it disappears (and citizens do not need to be convinced of the legality of this option and 
opposing constituencies cannot blame it as illegal). Making the provision explicit (perceptible 
beforehand as an implicit possibility) makes its use more credible as well as the threat of its use. The 
costs of activating the formerly purely political exit option decrease. 
Second, an explicit and easier exit option permits a discursive construction of ‘product 
deterioration’ which may not be necessarily be based on a loyal interpretation of the situation (and let 
us recall that loyalty is defined as the propensity to look for solutions to product deterioration within 
an organisation). A loyalist interpretation of product deterioration leads to demands for reform (i.e. 
voice) rather than to the exercise of exit. The Cecchini Report on the Cost of non-Europe (1988)
88
 
provides the archetype of a loyal diagnosis of product deterioration. Starting with the diagnosis of the 
problems in the functioning of the single market in the 1970s and 1980s, the Report valued the 
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possible gains through common action at the EU level for achieving the single market. The SEA 
responded to this diagnosis by introducing the 1992 programme and a number of additional 
mechanism such as harmonisation and the extensive introduction of mutual recognition of standards 
plus the adoption of qualified majority voting for market-related measures. The success of the strategy 
means that today, the Cost of Non Europe Reports
89
 follow the same approach of evaluating gains 
and/or the realisation of a public good through common action at the EU level. Note that the approach 
may also apply when the diagnosis recommends the suppression of EU competence: this is possible, 
for instance, with the CAP. 
The existence of the exit option transforms diagnosis into an exercise in which changing 
preferences based on considerations such as identity can substitute the clear identification of ‘product 
deterioration’. Thus, in the case of the UK process, examination of the hypothetical defects in the 
EU’s economic constitution90 have been found, in reality, ill-founded (and a poor rationale for leaving 
the Union).
91
 Similarly, diagnosis of the EU’s ‘creeping competence’ and its alleged attempt 
constantly to overreach its powers are not confirmed by empirical scrutiny. This suspicion caused the 
Dutch and British ‘review of competences’: the British government reviewed all the competences of 
the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders, producing 
reviews in thirty-two policy areas over the period 2013–2015. After two UK government reports, the 
findings confirm that there is little or no case for a repatriation of EU competences.
92
 Similarly, the 
Bank of England concluded that EU membership probably increased the dynamism of the UK 
economy and its ability to grow. It also noticed that flexibility in applying EU rules was respected for 
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national regulators and supervisors.
93
 These examples refute the ‘disloyal’ construction of the product 
deterioration diagnosis.  
Alternatively, how real is the loss of voice as the trigger for a withdrawal demand? In relation to 
the UK, Simon Hix and his collaborators have shown that the UK has not been marginalised on 
average in the making of EU laws. Moreover, the UK has been more closely aligned to the final 
outcomes more often than most other governments and this is true also for issues of greater salience 
for the UK government. In fact, the UK government’s preferences were the fourth closest to the final 
policy outcomes.
94
 When looking at the patterns of voting within the Council, records suggest that 
there has been a significant shift in the position of the UK government when comparing 2004–2009 to 
2009–2015, with the UK government voting against the majority more often in the later period and 
being on the losing side more than any other state. Yet the UK was part of the wining majority 87% of 
the cases (without neglecting the fact that most decisions are, in fact, adopted by consensus).
95
 As for 
the EP, an analysis of MEP voting patterns (2009–2014) shows that British MEPs were less likely to 
be on the winning side than MEPs from any other Member State. But far from being evidence of 
marginalisation, the reason for these results is that the three main political groups dominated voting 
and the number of British MEPs in these groups declined as result of the departure of British 
conservatives from the EPP and fewer British MEPs being elected from parties aligned to ALDE and 
the S&D.
96
 Again, Hix et al. show that British MEPs did reasonably well in some policy areas the UK 
cares about, such as the internal market, international trade and international development, but are 
most often marginalised in budgetary issues. This results largely from the British conservatives 
leaving the EPP and the increase in UKIP MEPs (who are almost always on the losing side).
97
 But 
even in this situation, British MEPs have managed to capture a number of powerful agenda-setting 
positions; for instance, a Brit has chaired the powerful internal market committee since 2004.
98
 
In summary, formalisation of the exit provision has provided space for a ‘disloyal’ (in Hirschman’s 
sense) portrayal of the EU´s ‘declining performance’ which empirical evidence does not confirm. As 
the authors of the Report
99
 quoted above conclude, ‘declining performance’ may exist: at a more 
detailed level, there can be individual actions or laws which might be done better or not at all. In this 
context, voice would be understood as a strong demand for correction. This form of declining 
performance is hardly a rationale for secession. 
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VII. The change of the voice mechanism: seeking selective exit 
Section 4 has outlined a typology of effects which connects with the discussion in Section 6 on the 
hypothetical reasons for withdrawal. This section in turn discusses how the interaction between 
specifically the strategic effects and the dis-loyal construction of the diagnosis affects how actors 
define ‘voice’ and the relationship between exit and voice. The explicit reference to exit changes the 
voice mechanism itself. Weiler described the consolidation of EU secondary legislation and its 
attached principles in exchange for an increased participation of the member states in decision making.  
The newly formalised exit constructs a different voice mechanism (let us recall that voice, for 
Hirschmann, was a messy and unclear mechanism in the domain of politics): ‘voice’ acquires the 
sense of acquiring some right for calling for the renegotiation (meaning ex post derogation) of the EU 
acquis and/or the terms of membership in the EU. In this respect, Article 50 can be read in connection 
with Article 48(2) which establishes that proposals for amending the treaties ‘may, inter alia, serve 
either to increase or to reduce the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties’. Article 48(2) 
was negotiated at the same time as the new withdrawal provisions. Voice then turns into demands to 
address the discursively constructed ‘declining performance’ through a reduction of the Union’s scope 
of activity. And this marks a transformation of the relationship between exit and the closure of 
selective exit with which Weiler characterised the EU: while in Weiler’s analysis voice remained a 
mechanism for guaranteeing intergovernmental control of decision making, Article 50 allows states to 
gain voice by obtaining unilateral derogations and exemptions from previously unanimously agreed 
common policies. 
For the moment, the rigidity of the Article 48 procedures protects the EU from unilateral de-
constitutionalisation attempts. However, it does not discourage seeking alternative arrangements, as 
happened with the package negotiated and agreed with the UK government in February 2015. The 
threat of withdrawal thus forced the Union to enter into the negotiation of a ‘reform’ without using the 
Article 48 procedure (which implies inter alia a Convention). And a single Member State has been 
able to unilaterally establish the agenda.  
Are there real prospects of these voice demands (equal to unilateral ex post derogations) being 
successful? The chances of this voice strategy succeeding are slim. The threat of exit matters if it is 
credible and if its exercise imposes costs onto the remaining members.
100
 Certainly, a withdrawing 
state may gain some negotiating power through a strategy of ‘defiance’101 since the period between 
announcement and effective withdrawal creates opportunities for blackmail. The withdrawing state 
will remain part of the EU decision-making process and it may be tempted to use this as a tool to 
secure more beneficial terms in the withdrawal agreement. It may also be tempted to exercise some 
sort of legal detachment (see above). In this respect, the EU’s responses (for instance, an infringement 
procedure) would be increasingly ineffective. 
One potential cost for remaining members is the damage that an exit inflicts on the abandoned 
institutional structure (its credibility or its capacity).
102
 The exit of the UK, however, would not 
undermine the EU’s credibility, because there is substantial information about the benefits of EU 
membership [which contradicts and potentially disarms the Eurosceptic denunciation of the EU’s 
decline in performance]. Of course, Eurosceptics may conjure up a scenario in which the UK’s exit 
causes the EU to plunge into a new age of protectionism. Nonetheless, it would appear that the 
advocates of a British exit grossly overestimate its impact on the remaining members as well as their 
willingness to accommodate the British with substantial institutional reforms. 
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VIII. Conclusions 
The introduction of Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon has subtly transformed the relationship between 
the voice and exit mechanisms that Weiler described in 1992. The explicit provision enables attempts 
to undermine loyalty by making it cheaper to level un-loyal criticism against the EU. But it has also 
allowed a transforming voice into demands for the degradation of the Union. Discussing the eventual 
introduction of a right to withdrawal in state constitutions, Cass Sustein warned that Constitutions 
ought not to include a right to secede:  
To place such a right in a founding document would increase the risks of ethnic and factional 
struggle; reduce the prospects for compromise and deliberation in government; raise dramatically 
the stakes of day-to-day political decisions; introduce irrelevant and illegitimate considerations 
into those decisions; create dangers of blackmail, strategic behaviour, and exploitation; and, most 
generally, endanger the prospects for long-term self-governance. Constitutionalism addresses 
precisely these kind of risks.
103
  
Similarly, Hirschman also warned that ‘once the exit mechanism is readily available, the contribution 
of voice’ – that is of the political process – ‘to such matters is likely to be and remain limited’.104 The 
conclusions of these two scholars along with the analysis provided in this chapter and the lessons 
learned from the UK experience show that the withdrawal provision in Article 50 is not the EU’s 
greatest contribution to global constitutionalism. 
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